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The Effect of Employee Stock 
Options on the Evolution
of Compensation in the 1990s
rom an economic standpoint, the 1990s were a remarkable 
period. On the one hand, the decade produced the longest-
running U.S. expansion. On the other hand, a by-product of 
this continued economic growth was a sharp tightening of the 
U.S. labor market. This growing scarcity of available workers 
raised the concern that accelerating wage demands would 
develop, possibly leading to renewed inflation.
The 1990s were also noteworthy for the emergence of two 
“wage puzzles.” The first puzzle is associated with the 1992-95 
period, when nominal compensation per hour (CPH) growth 
declined and the unemployment rate fell rapidly (Chart 1).1 
One explanation for this occurrence is that “worker insecurity” 
early in the expansion accounted for the tepid pay demands 
during this period.2 From 1995 to 1998, the puzzle ceased to 
exist, as compensation growth accelerated and the unem-
ployment rate fell below the 4 percent barrier. However, the 
second wage puzzle appeared in 1999, when compensation 
growth fell back below the 5 percent level despite continued 
labor market tightness during the year.
In this article, we examine the wage-puzzle phenomenon of 
the 1990s. Specifically, we explore whether changes in pay 
structure can account for the behavior of CPH during the 
decade. Labor markets have changed considerably over the past 
twenty years: workers today receive a higher portion of total 
Hamid Mehran is an assistant vice president and Joseph Tracy
a vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
<hamid.mehran@ny.frb.org>
<joseph.tracy@ny.frb.org>
The authors benefited from discussions with Elizabeth Keating and Alan Marcus 
and from the comments of seminar participants at the Department of Labor and 
at Georgetown University Law Center’s conference “Contracts with Highly 
Skilled Workers.” They thank John Campbell, John Graham, and Martin Lettau 
for providing data, Nathanial Baum-Snow and Dan Burdick for excellent 
research assistance, and two anonymous referees. They also thank Hewitt 
Associates for technical assistance and summaries of its data and Thermo 
Electron for information on its employee stock options program and reporting. 
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
• As the labor market tightened in 1999, the 
growth rate of compensation per hour (CPH) 
unexpectedly slowed.
• The decline in CPH may be attributed to the 
rapid increase in new employee stock option 
grants relative to the realization of options 
awarded before 1999.
• Employee stock options are captured in the 
CPH measure on the exercise date, not on the 
date granted, and the options’ value can 
change considerably over the several years 
that can elapse between these dates.
• A recalculation of CPH that reflects the value 
of options on the grant date suggests no 
downturn in compensation growth in 1999.
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compensation in such nontraditional forms as profit sharing 
and stock options.3 CPH captures profit-sharing payments and 
stock option realizations. However, employee stock options are 
reflected in total compensation on the date they are exercised—
not on the date granted—and several years can elapse between 
these dates. Accordingly, the growing use of these stock options 
could be affecting the time that tight labor markets are reflected 
in CPH growth.
By analyzing the existing data, we determine how CPH 
growth is affected by the use of employee stock options. 
However, given the limitations of these data, we focus 
primarily on the second wage puzzle, that of the late 1990s. We 
find evidence that employee stock options may have had an 
appreciable impact on CPH during this period. In particular, 
when we recalculate compensation to reflect current stock 
option grants—rather than current realizations—we conclude 
that there was likely no downturn in CPH growth in 1999.4
The article is organized as follows. We begin by describing 
the essential institutional details of employee stock options 
necessary for our empirical work. We then discuss empirical 
models of stock option grant and realization decisions. Next, 
we use these estimates to assess the effect of stock options on 
compensation per hour. We conclude by addressing some 
general labor market implications of stock options.
Employee Stock Options
Employee stock options are the right to purchase a given 
number of shares of company stock at the “strike” price 
between the vesting date and the expiration date of the 
options.5 The vesting period is the interval between when a 
company grants the option and when the employee can first 
exercise the option. If the current market price for a vested 
option exceeds the strike price, the option is “in-the-money.” 
If in-the-money options are exercised (that is, if the employee 
decides to purchase the underlying shares), the gain to the 
employee is the difference between the current market price 
and the strike price multiplied by the number of shares 
exercised.6 If the current market price for a vested option is 
below the strike price, the option is “out-of-the-money.” 
Although out-of-the-money options have no current value if 
exercised, they still have positive “option value,” which reflects 
the possibility that the future market price of the stock may rise 
above the strike price prior to the options’ expiration date.
Employee stock options can be structured either as incentive 
stock options or as nonqualified stock options. Incentive stock 
options must satisfy certain restrictions defined by the Internal 
Revenue Service that do not apply to nonqualified options.7 
The primary advantages to employees exercising incentive 
stock options are that the income derived is taxed as a capital 
gain, rather than as ordinary income, and the tax is levied when 
the underlying shares are sold, rather than when the option 
shares are exercised. Offsetting these tax gains to employees, 
however, is the loss of a tax deduction to the firm. In contrast 
to incentive stock options, the income gain from nonqualified 
stock options is treated for tax purposes as ordinary income to 
the employee as of the exercise date, and the company can 
deduct this cost as a labor expense. Employers are required to 
file quarterly reports (ES202s) that list all taxable sources of 
income paid to their workers, including realized nonqualified 
stock options. The ES202 reports are used as an input into total 
compensation. However, these reports do not break out the 
gain from nonqualified stock options from other sources of 
compensation. Nonqualified options became the dominant 
type of employee stock option following the reduction in 
marginal income tax rates in 1986.
In January 1993, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) began requiring public firms to disclose in their proxy 
statements both the level of stock option grants to, and the 
option exercise activity of, their top five executives. The SEC 
also required companies to report their executive compen-
sation for the two previous years in their annual filings with the 
agency. Beginning in 1991, then, it is possible to collect detailed 
information on public company stock option programs for top 
management. Although firms can value these option grants 
using any pricing methodology, the dominant method used is 
the Black-Scholes pricing formula.
Employee stock options differ in many important ways 
from traded stock options. Most notably, they are FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2001 19
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nontradeable. An employee can exercise a vested in-the-money 
option but cannot sell the option to an investor. An implication 
of this is that both the employee’s valuation of the option and 
the timing of the exercise decision are affected by the 
employee’s risk tolerance. An employee with a significant 
amount of wealth tied up in company stock options has a 
strong interest in diversifying the risk from movements in the 
value of the company stock. With traded stock options, the 
employee could simply sell some options in the market to 
another investor, an action that transfers but does not diminish 
the options’ underlying value. With employee stock options, 
the employee would have to exercise the options in order to 
diversify his risk.8 This creates an incentive for the early 
exercise of the options, which reduces their overall value 
because the employee forgoes the remaining option value. 
Huddart and Lang (1996) show that workers tend to exercise 
employee stock options soon after their vesting dates, and that 
this early exercise sacrifices roughly half of the value implied by 
the Black-Scholes pricing methodology (which is designed to 
price a traded stock option).
Employee stock options differ from traded stock options in 
two other key ways. As we observed, employee stock options 
are subject to vesting requirements and tend to have a 
significant time period until expiration. A variety of vesting 
schedules are used in practice, with the majority of plans 
incorporating vesting over two to five years.9 In addition, an 
employee must exercise any vested in-the-money options prior 
to leaving the firm; any nonvested or out-of-the-money 
options must be forfeited upon termination of employment. 
This restriction creates an additional reason for early exercise 
of these options.10
Measuring the Importance
of Employee Stock Options
Our primary data source is Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp 
database. ExecuComp includes annual data from proxy 
statements for the five highest paid executives in three cohorts 
of firms: the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P Small 
Cap 600.11 Standard and Poor’s makes some adjustments to the 
firms in the database each year. Our pooled sample, which 
covers the 1992-99 period, comprises a total of approximately 
2,000 companies. We make extensive use of three specific items 
from the ExecuComp data: the total number of new grants to 
all employees, the number of grants and their value going to the 
top five executives, and the value of options exercised by the 
top five executives. We calculate the total value of all new grants 
in a year by scaling up the value of the grants to the top five 
executives by the ratio of the total number of options granted 
to the number of options granted to the top five executives.12
The ExecuComp data are valuable for examining general 
trends in the use of employee stock options during the 1990s. 
For example, over the decade, stock options became the 
dominant component of an executive’s compensation package. 
We illustrate this remarkable change using two measures of the 
relative importance of executive stock options. The first is the 
ratio of the grant value of new options in a year divided by the 
executive’s base salary and cash bonus. The second is the ratio 
of the income gain from stock option realizations in a year 
divided by the executive’s base salary and cash bonus. Chart 2 
presents the averages for these two ratios from 1992 to 1999. 
An employee with a significant amount of 
wealth tied up in company stock options 
has a strong interest in diversifying the risk 
from movements in the value of the 
company stock. . . . This creates an 
incentive for the early exercise of the 
options, which reduces their overall value.20 The Effect of Employee Stock Options
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Early in the 1990s, both ratios indicated that stock options 
typically were smaller than an executive’s base salary and cash 
bonus. By 1996, both ratios equaled or exceeded 1. Two years 
later, continued rapid growth in the expansion of executive 
stock option programs had pushed both ratios above 2, with 
new grants averaging around 250 percent of an executive’s base 
salary and bonus. In 1999, the grant ratio leveled off, while 
there was a sharp reduction in the realization ratio.13
An important related question is whether the use of stock 
options is also filtering its way down the ranks of company 
pay structures. The ExecuComp data allow us to track the 
percentage distribution of total new stock option grants 
awarded to the top five executives. Although this is a very 
restrictive view of the diffusion of stock options down the 
corporate ranks, it has the advantage of providing some 
sense of recent trends. Chart 3 shows the equally weighted 
twenty-fifth, fiftieth, and seventy-fifth percentiles of these 
top five percentages from 1992 to 1999. Despite the 
dramatic rise in the use of stock options for executives, there 
has actually been a slight decline in the fraction of new stock 
option grants directed toward upper management. This 
indicates that there has also been a commensurate increase 
over the 1990s in the use of stock options for employees 
below the top management level.
Given the rapid rise in the use of stock options, it is 
interesting to speculate on the effect of these options on 
aggregate compensation growth in the private sector. As noted 
earlier, aggregate compensation reflects nonqualified stock 
options when they are realized, rather than when they are 
granted. Unfortunately, there currently are no collected data 
that permit the direct measurement of the total size of stock 
option grants or realizations in the labor market. The 
alternative is to estimate total stock option grants and 
nonqualified stock option realizations by year. The growth rate 
of CPH net of the income from stock option realizations can 
then be constructed and contrasted with its actual growth rate. 
In addition, the cash value of new stock option grants can be 
added into this net-of-realizations CPH measure to arrive at a 
more accurate measure of current labor market pay conditions. 
We now turn our attention to implementing this approach.
The private, nonfarm sector consists of publicly traded and 
private firms. Over the past five years, public firms have 
accounted for between 47 and 50 percent of employment in 
the private, nonfarm business sector. The ExecuComp data 
consist entirely of publicly traded firms, and in 1998 the data 
covered roughly 46 percent of total employment in public 
firms.14 Detailed characteristics of publicly traded firms are 
available from the COMPUSTAT data, and equity returns for 
these firms are available from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) data. For private firms, we have no 
similar data on their characteristics, nor do we have any 
details of stock option plans from which to draw any 
inferences. However, a recent Bureau of  Labor Statistics study 
found that the incidence of stock options in privately held 
firms in 1999 was significantly below that for publicly held 
firms.15 Based on this evidence, we focus our analysis 
exclusively on public firms.
The basic question, then, is how best to use the ExecuComp 
data to estimate total stock option grants and realizations for 
publicly held firms. The simplest approach would be to assume 
for each year that all employees in these firms that are outside 
the ExecuComp sample are awarded new stock option grants 
and realize vested stock options at the average rate observed in 
that year for employees covered in the ExecuComp data. This 
approach, however, ignores potentially important variations 
across firms in their use of stock options that relate to firm 
There has actually been a slight decline
in the fraction of new stock option grants 
directed toward upper management.
This indicates that there has also been
a commensurate increase over the 1990s 
in the use of stock options for employees 
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characteristics. Taking these variations into account may 
provide a more accurate estimate of the overall impact of
stock options on total compensation.
Determinants of Stock Option Grants
We begin with the problem of estimating stock option grants, 
since the volume of prior grants is likely to be an important 
predictor of current realizations. For firms in the ExecuComp 
sample, we can calculate the Black-Scholes value of the total 
employee stock option grants made in the year. Although we are 
interested in understanding the determinants of a firm’s decision 
regarding the total amount of new grants to make in a year, we 
find it useful to look at the executive compensation literature for 
guidance on an appropriate empirical specification.
The literature on executive compensation starts with the 
premise that optimal compensation policies should address 
agency problems between the firm’s managers and its equity 
and debt holders. The two methods for ameliorating these 
agency problems are monitoring and incentives.16 A general 
prediction is that stock options will be more extensively used 
when agency costs are high and monitoring is difficult. In 
addition, the accounting treatment of stock options discussed 
earlier suggests that firms may also use the options for tax or 
liquidity reasons.
We include several variables to control for expected agency 
costs. Monitoring may become difficult when a firm has 
significant growth opportunities. Information asymmetries 
may arise from these opportunities, making evaluation of the 
managers’ investment choices more difficult (see, for example, 
Mehran [1992]; Smith and Watts [1992]; and Bizjak et al. 
[1993]). Stronger incentives therefore are needed to compen-
sate for the monitoring difficulties. These additional incentives 
can be provided by increasing the share of stock options in total 
compensation. We measure a firm’s growth opportunities 
using its market-to-book value. The prediction is that stock 
option grants will be positively related to this value.
It is also difficult to monitor managers in an environment in 
which a significant amount of noise is associated with the firm’s 
performance (Lambert and Larcker 1987). In such an environ-
ment, a higher pay-performance sensitivity is warranted. 
Yermack (1995) proxies this sensitivity using the ratio of the 
relative variability of accounting returns versus stock returns. 
We focus just on the variability of stock returns over the prior 
year. The prediction is that higher stock return variability will 
lead to increased use of stock options. However, higher stock 
return variability also increases the manager’s risk exposure, 
which should lead to a higher risk premium to compensate the 
manager for this added risk.17 This risk premium increases the 
relative price to the firm of using stock options versus cash 
compensation, which may induce the firm to substitute away 
from stock options in its pay structure. The overall effect of 
stock return variability on the use of stock options therefore 
is ambiguous.
Capital structure may also exert an important influence on 
a firm’s compensation system. Stock options, by increasing 
managers’ pay-performance sensitivity, may encourage 
managers to pursue riskier investment strategies that tend to 
favor equity holders over debt holders. If this shift in 
investment strategies is anticipated by bondholders, the 
increased reliance on stock options will give rise to a debt 
premium that differentially impacts highly leveraged firms 
(John and John 1993). To reduce this agency cost of debt, 
highly leveraged firms may choose to scale back their use of 
stock options. This should lead to an inverse relationship 
between a firm’s leverage and its reliance on stock options.18
To help control for any firm life-cycle effects on the use of 
stock options, we control for a firm’s age, which we measure as 
the number of years over which the firm’s stock has been 
traded. If young firms tend to be more cash-flow constrained, 
then we would expect them to rely more heavily on stock 
options. When a firm issues new stock options, it typically 
incurs no current expense, rather, the expense is shifted to the 
future, when the stock options are realized. Workers, however, 
value these new stock options, and are willing to accept lower 
current cash compensation as a consequence. This should lead 
to a negative relationship between firm age and the granting of 
stock options. We also directly proxy for cash-flow constraints 
using an indicator variable for whether the firm has a net 
operating loss in the current year.
Our remaining firm-specific variables include measures of 
recent performance and size. We measure firm performance 
using return on assets. We use the size of the firm’s assets and 
employment to control for possible scale effects. Finally, we 
include two-digit industry effects and year effects to control for 
The use of stock options varies with firm 
performance and firm size. Firms with a 
high return on assets tend to grant fewer 
new stock options. . . . Stock option grants 
tend to increase with firm size as measured 
by employment and total assets.22 The Effect of Employee Stock Options
any remaining differences across industries and time in the 
pattern of stock option grants.
Table 1 presents our estimation results for stock option 
grants (summary statistics are provided in Appendix A). For 
most of our control variables of interest, we divide the range of 
the variable into quartiles and create indicator variables for the 
upper three quartiles. The coefficient on an indicator variable 
should be interpreted as the difference in the use of stock 
option grants between a firm with a value of the indicated 
variable in the specified quartile and a similar firm with a value 
of the indicated variable in the bottom quartile (holding all 
values for other variables at their sample means).
The use of stock options varies with firm performance and 
firm size. Firms with a high return on assets tend to grant fewer 
new stock options. For example, grants for firms performing at 
or above the median in return on assets tend to be around 35 to 
40 percent below the poorest performing firms. Stock option 
grants tend to increase with firm size as measured by employ-
ment and total assets. The employment relationship applies 
only to the top size quartile, while the asset relationship holds 
throughout the size range and is quite large in magnitude, but 
is imprecisely estimated. Core and Guay (1999) find that 
executive stock and option incentives are positively related to 
firm size as measured by equity value.
Empirical support exists for the agency cost of debt 
constraint on employee stock options. Controlling for other 
factors, we find that highly leveraged firms tend to pay out 
fewer new stock option grants. Firms in the highest quartile of 
leverage have new grants that are on average 26 percent below 
the level of firms in the lowest quartile of leverage. These 
results are in contrast to Yermack’s (1995) empirical findings.
Monitoring problems arising from potential market 
opportunities and noisy environments also play an 
important role in determining the flow of new stock option 
grants. Firms with higher market-to-book value tend to 
have much more aggressive stock option programs, as 
evidenced by consistently higher flows of new stock option 
grants. This effect is especially pronounced for firms in the 
top market-to-book-value quartile that are predicted to 
have on average a 300 percent larger flow of stock option 
grants than firms in the bottom quartile. Higher stock 
return volatility reduces the magnitude of a firm’s stock 
option grants. These findings are consistent with the 
existing empirical literature (see Core and Guay [1999, 
2000]).
We also find support for the prediction that firms facing 
cash-flow constraints substitute stock options for cash 
compensation. The data suggest that firms experiencing a 
net operating loss in a given year have stock option grants 
that are 24 percent higher than those of similar firms with 
operating profits.19 In addition, younger firms tend to 
rely more heavily on the use of stock options in their 
compensation structure: a ten-year increase in firm age is 
associated with an 8 percent decline in stock option 
grants.
Table 1






Return on assets Market-to-book value
Second quartile -27.7** Second quartile 43.4**
(5.1) (6.0)
Third quartile -34.4** Third quartile 104.8**
(4.7) (9.3)
Fourth quartile -39.1** Fourth quartile 300.3**
(4.5) (20.5)
Log employment Stock return risk
Second quartile 5.3 Second quartile -13.5
(15.6) (18.0)
Third quartile 3.3 Third quartile -31.7**
(15.5) (10.2)
Fourth quartile 64.7** Fourth quartile -23.3**
(25.2) (11.2)
Log assets Net operating loss 24.2**
(5.0)
Second quartile 89.1 Firm age (ten years) -8.4**
(94.4) (1.5)
Third quartile 343.1 Number of observations 8,182
(221.8)









Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Standard and Poor’s 
ExecuComp database and COMPUSTAT.
Notes: Ordinary least squares estimates of the percentage changes in the 
Black-Scholes grant value are reported with standard errors in parentheses. 
Two-digit industry and year effects are included in the specification.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2001 23
Determinants of Stock Option Realizations
The ExecuComp data report the stock option realizations for 
each of the top five executives. What is not reported are the 
total stock option realizations generated by the other 
employees. To estimate total realizations, we assume that the 
time pattern of stock option realizations by the top five 
executives can be used to proxy for the time pattern of 
realizations by the remaining employees.20 Specifically, we 
calculate a firm’s total realizations in the year by scaling up the 
realizations by the top five executives using the ratio of total 
grants to top five grants from two years earlier.21
The empirical specification for a firm’s total stock option 
realizations is motivated in part by the characteristics of 
employee stock option plans. In any given year, an employee 
has the right to realize any vested stock options. As previously 
noted, there is a strong tendency for employees to exercise 
options close to their vesting dates. While vesting schedules 
vary across firms, the typical vesting rules imply that it would 
be important to control for stock option grants from two to five 
years prior to the current year. Given the short time span 
covered by the ExecuComp data, we compromise and include 
only grants from two years prior to the current year.
Vested stock options are exercised only if they are in-the-
money. Since the option strike price typically is set equal to the 
market price on the grant date, the cumulative stock return 
during the vesting period will determine whether an option is
in-the-money on the date it vests. If a firm makes grants to 
employees over several years and uses a staggered vesting 
schedule, the appropriate stock return to examine would be a 
weighted average of different cumulative returns over the 
various vesting periods. Since we lack the detailed data necessary 
to calculate this particular stock return, we use as our proxy the 
firm’s cumulative stock return over the prior two years.
A prominent feature of stock option realization data is that in 
a given year many firms experience no realizations, even if these 
firms have continuously made grants over the past several years. 
In our sample of approximately 5,189 firm/year observations for 
which we have complete data for all of our control variables,
32 percent involve no realizations by the firm in that year. To 
account for the high frequency of zero realizations in the data, we 
use a generalized Tobit specification. (Details on the Tobit 
model are provided in Appendix B.)
The generalized Tobit results are presented in Table 2. For ease 
of interpretation, we convert the generalized Tobit coefficients 
into three marginal effects: the implied impact of a variable on
1) the probability that a firm will experience a positive realization 
in the year, 2) the percentage change in the expected log 
realizations conditional on a positive realization, and 3) the 
percentage change in the unconditional expected log realizations.
Table 2 
Determinants of Stock Option Realizations
Variable 
Probability 












Grants, lag two years  2.1** 75.1** 75.3**
(0.6) (5.3)  (8.5)
Cumulative two-year stock
 return
Second quartile  18.0** 4.0 280.7**
(2.5) (4.1)  (89.9)
Third quartile  28.2** 89.9** 1,153.0**
(2.5) (22.9)  (328.6) 
Fourth quartile  32.9** 205.3** 2,541.0**
(2.5) (37.3)  (750.3) 
Log employment
Second quartile  20.3** -38.5 274.4
(9.1) (27.7)  (310.1)
Third quartile  23.2** -25.5 432.7
(8.9) (32.9)  (432.5)
Fourth quartile  27.5** -14.9 715.4
(8.9) (37.6)  (666.2)
Leverage
Second quartile  -0.3 7.4 2.9
(2.5) (11.3)  (23.5)
Third quartile  2.3 12.9 31.1
(2.5) (11.8) (29.1)
Fourth quartile  -2.0 2.2 12.7
(2.7) (11.9)  (21.4)
Market-to-book value
Second quartile  11.9** 59.0** 221.5**
(2.1) (14.5)  (63.4)
Third quartile 21.7** 118.1** 772.8**
(2.2) (21.4) (204.6)
Fourth quartile  26.5** 223.1** 1,653.2**
(2.3) (34.8)  (467.8)
Stock return risk
Third quartile  5.9** 11.4   77.4**
(2.1) (10.4) (39.3)
Number of observations  5,189a 3,508  5,189a 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Standard and Poor’s 
ExecuComp database and COMPUSTAT.
Notes: Generalized Tobit marginal effects are reported with standard 
errors in parentheses. Two-digit industry and year effects are included
in the specification.
aThe sample size is smaller than it is in Table 1 because of the inclusion 
of the lag-grants variable.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.24 The Effect of Employee Stock Options
The level of prior grants and the two-year cumulative stock 
return both have positive and significant effects on current 
realizations. Higher prior grants of stock options raise both the 
probability that a firm has positive realizations in the current 
year (Table 2, column 1) and the expected magnitude of these 
realizations conditional on the realizations being positive 
(Table 2, column 2). Holding constant the level of prior grants, 
we see that current realizations are sharply increasing in the 
firm’s two-year cumulative stock return. Like prior grants, 
higher stock returns increase both the incidence and 
magnitude of current realizations. These findings are 
consistent with the results of previous case studies (Huddart 
and Lang 1996).
Although larger firms are more likely to experience positive 
stock option realizations in a year, firm size as measured by 
employment has no significant impact on the conditional 
magnitude of the realizations. Similarly, holding constant our 
other control variables, we observe that the degree of firm 
leverage has no significant impact on realizations. Stock option 
realizations show a strong positive relationship with a firm’s 
market-to-book value, reflecting a positive effect of the value 
on the incidence and magnitude of realizations. Furthermore, 
higher stock risk raises the likelihood that a firm will experience 
positive realizations, but it has no further impact on the 
magnitude.
The Effect of Stock Options
on Compensation per Hour
We now assess the overall impact of stock options on aggre-
gate compensation per hour, using our earlier estimates to 
predict grants and realizations for all COMPUSTAT firms. 
We use actual firm data on grants and realizations where 
reported in the ExecuComp sample. For COMPUSTAT 
firms not in the ExecuComp sample for which we have a 
complete set of control variables (where we use predicted 
instead of actual lag stock option grants), we predict stock 
option realizations using the estimated model in Table 2. 
For the remaining COMPUSTAT firms for which we have 
missing data for one or more control variables, we impute 
their stock option realizations.22 We aggregate these actual 
and estimated grants and realizations across all publicly 
traded firms, and then multiply by the assumed percentage 
of employee stock options that represent nonqualified stock 
options.23 This calculation provides our estimate of the 
total income generated from nonqualified stock options in 
that year.
Table 3 shows total compensation for the private, nonfarm 
business sector, our estimates of total nonqualified stock 
option grants and realizations, and the growth rates of all three 
for 1995 through 1999. The findings are presented both on an 
aggregate and a per-worker basis. The data indicate that in the 
mid-1990s, stock option grants and realizations amounted to 
less than 1 percent of total compensation. However, the growth 
rates of both have significantly exceeded the growth rate of 
compensation. For example, stock option grants and 
realizations in 1998 grew by 56 percent and 53 percent, 
respectively, whereas total compensation grew by 8 percent. 
Over the five years from 1995 to 1999, stock option realizations 
per worker more than doubled, from $395 to $1,068.24
The rapid rate of increase in the magnitude of employee 
stock options raises the possibility that they had a significant 
impact on CPH growth in recent years. This growth can be 
expressed as a weighted average of the growth in stock option 
realizations per hour and the growth in other compensation 
per hour. The weight on the growth in stock option realizations 
per hour is the share of realizations in that year to total 
compensation. Despite the small weight given to stock option 
realizations per hour, their fast growth rate, as seen in Table 3, 
may imply a significant contribution to compensation growth.
Our estimates of the effect of stock options on CPH growth 
are provided in Table 4. For reference, we also include the 
annual growth in CPH (column 2). We start by recomputing 
the growth rate in each year and removing from total 
compensation an estimate of overall nonqualified stock option 
realizations in public companies. We do this using two 
different approaches. First, we perform a simple extrapolation 
from the ExecuComp sample, which requires no estimation 
(column 3). For each year, we calculate the average stock 
option realizations per employee based on all firms in the 
ExecuComp sample. We then gross this figure up to cover all 
public firms by assuming that all workers in public firms not in 
the ExecuComp sample realized this average value of stock 
options. Our second (and preferred) approach is to use our 
estimates from Table 2 to predict stock option realizations for 
COMPUSTAT firms not in the ExecuComp sample (column 
4). In both cases, we subtract the implied income derived from 
Stock options may be changing the 
traditional relationship between 
unemployment rates and pay measures.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2001 25
nonqualified stock option realizations from total compen-
sation in that year, and we divide by total hours to recompute 
CPH net of the effect of stock option realizations.25
Our calculations reveal that the actual growth in nominal 
CPH accelerated from around 2 percent in 1995 to 5 percent in 
1998, consistent with the labor market tightening that occurred 
during this period. Notice, however, that if we had removed the 
contribution of stock option realizations from public 
companies using our second approach, CPH growth in 1998 
would have been 4.3 percent. Thus, stock option realizations 
appear to have contributed around 0.7 percentage point to 
CPH growth in 1998. This finding illustrates the sizable impact 
that a fast-growing segment of compensation can have on 
overall CPH growth rates, even when that segment still 
accounts for a small fraction of overall compensation.
Having removed the influence of current stock option 
realizations from CPH, we now recalculate CPH growth by 
including the estimated cash value of new employee stock 
option grants (column 5). This last adjustment yields a CPH 
measure that should reflect current labor market conditions 
more accurately. To recalculate CPH, we add the cash value of 
new employee stock option grants to total compensation less 
stock option realizations in that year and divide by total hours.
It is now reasonable to ask whether the peculiar way in 
which stock options enter CPH offers an explanation for the 
second pay puzzle of the 1990s. To answer this question, we 
Table 3 











(Billions of Dollars)c 
Grants as a Percentage
of Compensation
Panel A: Aggregate
1995 3,488.1 38.6 1.1  26.5 0.8
(4.6) (84.2)  (7.3) 
1996 3,656.9 49.8 1.4  39.6 1.1
(4.8) (28.8) (49.6) 
1997 3,911.1 71.6 1.8  55.6 1.4
(7.0) (43.8) (40.3) 
1998 4,214.7 109.3 2.6  86.7 2.1
(7.8) (52.7) (55.9) 
1999 4,489.1 116.0 2.6  110.5 2.5
(6.5) (6.1) (27.5)
Panel B: Per Workerd
1995 35,631 395 1.1  271 0.8
(1.5) (78.8) (4.2) 
1996 36,498 497 1.4  395 1.1
(2.4) (25.9) (46.2) 
1997 37,925 694 1.8  539 1.4
(3.9) (39.7) (36.3)
1998 39,749 1,032 2.6  817 2.1
(4.8) (48.6) (51.7) 
1999 41,333 1,068 2.6  1,018  2.5
(4.0) (3.6) (24.5)
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database and COMPUSTAT.
Notes: Stock option realizations and grants are estimates based on ExecuComp and COMPUSTAT data.
Percentage changes from the prior year are in parentheses.
a Private, nonfarm business sector.
b Public companies only—scaled by 82 percent to reflect nonqualified stock options (estimated).
c Public companies only—scaled by 50 percent to reflect effective cash value (estimated).
d We use the same sample and scaling as we do in the aggregate panel.26 The Effect of Employee Stock Options
examine the implied growth rate of CPH in 1998 and 1999 in 
which we have removed stock option realizations and included 
new grants. Despite continued labor market tightening in 1999, 
actual CPH decelerated from its 1998 growth rate, from
5.08 percent in 1998 to 4.64 percent in 1999. However, when 
we look at our adjusted CPH measure, we find that it continued 
to accelerate through 1999, from 4.95 percent in 1998 to
5.05 percent in 1999.26 The drop-off in the pace of actual CPH 
in 1999 can therefore potentially be explained by the rapid 
increase in new stock option grants in that year relative to 
current realizations from prior-year grants.
An implication of this finding is that stock options may 
be changing the traditional relationship between 
unemployment rates and pay measures. If firms increasingly 
use stock options as a substitute for wage and salary 
increases to attract and retain workers in a tight labor 
market, the impact of tight labor markets will either be 
muted in the data (for pay measures such as the employment 
cost index, which do not reflect stock options), or it will 
show up with a several-year lag (for pay measures such as 
CPH, which reflect realizations) because of the vesting 
requirements for stock options.
The most comparable effort to assess the impact of stock 
options on aggregate pay measures was made by Lebow et al. 
(1999). They construct a sample of employee stock option 
plans for 125 S&P 500 firms from 1994 to 1998. Using the 
details of the option grants, they calculate modified Black-
Scholes values for the new grants in each year. They find that 
over their sample period, the average stock option grant 
value per employee grew at a 31 percent annual rate. This 
result accords well with our data, which indicate an average 
annual 33 percent growth rate over this period. Assuming 
that all workers at public companies experienced the same 
growth rate in stock option grants, the authors calculate that 
the treatment of stock option grants as compensation on the 
grant date would have added roughly a quarter percentage 
point to growth in the employment cost index.
Additional Implications
Our analysis reveals that although employee stock options 
still represent a small fraction of total compensation in the 
United States, they have grown rapidly over the past few 
years. Accordingly, the recent growth in CPH has been 
significantly affected by the behavior of stock option grants 
and realizations (Table 4). These findings have several 
important implications.
If the trend in stock option use continues, CPH growth is 
likely to be more variable in the future than it has been. As we 
observed, current stock option realizations depend to a great 
extent on a firm’s recent stock performance. Swings in the 
equity markets will generate swings in stock option realizations 
that are likely to exceed the underlying movements in base 
wage and salary income. This increased volatility suggests that 
it will be more difficult to discern trend changes in CPH 
growth. Therefore, an understanding of the effect of stock 
options on CPH is critical for one to make the correct inference 
on the underlying pay trends. As such, more accurate and 
timely data on stock options are clearly needed.
A greater reliance on stock options may also increase 
overall pay flexibility in the U.S. labor market. Various 
arguments have been put forward as to why employers are 
reluctant to impose nominal wage cuts on workers during 
adverse times (see Lebow et al. [1995]; Groshen and 
Schweitzer [1996]; Card and Hyslop [1997]; and 
McLaughlin [1999]). A corollary is that some inflation is 
good for labor market efficiency because it allows for real 
wage reductions, even in the absence of nominal wage 
reductions. Stock options by design build in downward pay 
Table 4 















1995 2.09  1.41  1.61 1.63
(0.07) (0.07)
1996 3.07  2.78  2.82 3.14
(0.07) (0.07) 
1997 3.52 3.12 3.05 3.39
(0.09) (0.09) 
1998 5.08 3.79 4.30 4.95
(0.09) (0.09)
1999 4.64 3.31 4.65 5.05
(0.09) (0.08)
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Standard and Poor’s 
ExecuComp database and COMPUSTAT.
Notes: Private, nonfarm compensation per hour growth. Monte Carlo 
standard errors based on 1,000 simulations are in parentheses.
a Simple extrapolations based on ExecuComp data.
b Based on estimated models presented in Tables 2 and 3.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2001 27
flexibility. As noted earlier, the typical nonqualified stock 
option is issued with a strike price equal to the market price. 
If the firm does not produce equity gains during the vesting 
period, the options will remain out-of-the-money and will 
not be exercised by employees.27 This added pay flexibility 
may help to relax any constraints imposed by nominal wage 
rigidities that exist in the base wage and salary components 
of pay. Consequently, the labor market may be able to 
operate efficiently at a lower steady-state rate of inflation.
Furthermore, stock options may strengthen the link 
between pay and performance. Hall and Liebman (1998) 
argue that the rising importance of stock options in 
executive pay has been the primary determinant of the 
increased sensitivity of executive compensation to firm 
performance. As stock options filter down the salary ranks, 
an increasing segment of a firm’s salary liability will become 
linked to firm performance. This restructuring of the wage 
contract between a firm and its workers therefore may be 
contributing to the upturn in labor productivity (see Black 
and Lynch [2000]).
Conclusion
Between 1995 and 1998, actual growth in nominal compensation 
per hour accelerated from approximately 2 percent to
5 percent. Yet as labor markets continued to tighten in 1999, 
CPH growth paradoxically slowed. In this article, we have 
attempted to solve this aggregate wage puzzle by exploring 
whether changes in pay structure—specifically, the increased 
use of employee stock options—can account for the behavior 
of CPH in the late 1990s.
We conclude that the behavior of CPH can be explained 
largely by the point in time when employee stock options are 
captured in this measure. When we recalculate CPH growth
to reflect the value of current stock options when they are 
granted—rather than their value when they are realized—we 
find that our adjusted CPH measure accelerated in each year 
from 1995 to 1999. This finding suggests that in 1999 there was 
likely no downturn in CPH growth.28 The Effect of Employee Stock Options
Description Source Method of Calculation Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Panel A: Grants Regression
Total grant value
  (thousands of dollars)
ExecuComp Grants to top 5 * (100/% of grants to top 5) 31,378 356,183 15 14,200,000
Log total grant value ExecuComp 8.78 1.59 2.74 16.47
Return on assets,
  one-year lag
COMPUSTAT (Operating income before depreciation [13]
  + interest expense [15]) / (total assets [6]) 
0.16 0.11 -1.55 0.97
Employment (thousands) COMPUSTAT [29] 17.99 49.83 0.01 825.00
Log employment COMPUSTAT ln([29]) 1.49 1.70 -4.96 6.72
Total assets
  (millions of dollars)
COMPUSTAT [6] 5,109 21,675 14 668,641
Log total assets COMPUSTAT ln([6]) 6.96 1.63 2.62 13.41
Leverage ratio  COMPUSTAT Total long-term debt [9]/total assets [6] 0.19 0.16 0.00 1.75
Market value/book value,
  one-year lag
COMPUSTAT (Price-close calendar year [24] * shares outstanding
  [25] +  total assets [6] - common equity [60])/
  (total assets [6])
2.20 2.08 0.48 45.33
Standard deviation of stock
  returns, one-year lag
CRSP or Campbell
and Lettau
Firm-level (CRSP) data, if available, otherwise
  industry-level (Campbell and Lettau, Journal
  of Finance, forthcoming) data used
0.02 0.01 0.00 0.09
Number of years since stock
  first traded publicly
CRSP Data year minus year stock first traded publicly 13.60 9.85 0.00 30.00
Net operating loss COMPUSTAT 1 if [52] > 0; 0 if [52] = 0 0.31 0.39 0.00 1.00
Panel B: Probit—Positive Realizations
Total realized option value 
  (thousands of dollars)
ExecuComp Realized value for top 5 * (100/% of grants to
  top 5), two-year lag
6,492 12,693 -2 72,047
Log total realized option
  value
ExecuComp 5.37 4.02 0.00 11.185
Employment (thousands) COMPUSTAT [29] 16.79 45.34 0.005 756.30
Log employment  COMPUSTAT ln([29]) 1.53 1.60 -5.30 6.63
Leverage ratio  COMPUSTAT Total long-term debt [9]/total assets [6] 0.19 0.16 -0.04 1.72
Market value/book value COMPUSTAT (Price-close calendar year [24] * shares
  outstanding [25] + total assets [6] - common
  equity [60])/(total assets [6])
1.98 1.49 0.49 15.77
Standard deviation
  of stock returns
CRSP or Campbell
and Lettau
Firm-level (CRSP) data, if available, otherwise
  industry-level (Campbell and Lettau, Journal
  of Finance, forthcoming) data used
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.20
Percentage increase of stock
  returns over previous
  two years
CRSP 0.47 1.08 -0.99 18.95




ExecuComp data, if available, otherwise
  forecast used
8.41 1.40 2.74 13.51
Note: COMPUSTAT item numbers are in brackets.
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Description Source Method of Calculation Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Panel C: Realized Truncated Regression
Total realized option value
  (thousands of dollars)
ExecuComp Realized value for top 5 * (100/% of grants to
  top 5), two-year lag
9,602 14,439 0 72,047
Log total realized option value ExecuComp 7.94 1.86 0.34 11.19
Employment (thousands) COMPUSTAT [29] 18.49 47.95 0.04 756.30
Log employment  COMPUSTAT ln([29]) 1.63 1.60 -3.30 6.63
Leverage ratio  COMPUSTAT Total long-term debt [9]/total assets [6] 0.18 0.15 -0.04 1.72
Market value/book value COMPUSTAT (Price-close calendar year [24] * shares outstanding
  [25] + total assets [6] - common equity [60])/
  (total assets [6])
2.13 1.62 0.56 15.77
Standard deviation
  of stock returns
CRSP or Campbell
  and Lettau
Firm-level (CRSP) data, if available, otherwise
  industry-level (Campbell and Lettau, Journal
  of Finance, forthcoming) data used
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.12
Percentage increase of stock
  returns over previous
  two years
CRSP 0.60 1.18 -0.95 18.95
Log total grants, two-year lag ExecuComp
or forecast
ExecuComp data, if available, otherwise
  forecast used
8.50 1.38 2.74 13.51
Mills ratio Probit model (Xb from probit) /  (Xb from probit) 0.46 0.24 0.06 1.91 φΦ30 The Effect of Employee Stock Options
Appendix B: Estimating the Level of Stock Option Realizations
normality of the two error terms, the observed stock option 
realizations have the following conditional mean:
,
where   and   are the standard normal density function and 
cumulative density functions, respectively. The expected 
unconditional stock option realizations are given by the 
probability of observing positive realizations in a year 
multiplied by the expected conditional magnitude of the 
realizations.
.
We estimate this model in two steps. First, we estimate
the   parameters using a probit model. Using these estimates, 
we calculate the variable   for each observation with a 
positive realization. We then estimate the   parameters by 
regressing the log positive realizations on our   variables
and .
φΦ









We use a generalized Tobit framework to estimate a firm’s 
stock option realizations. Let   denote a latent index for the 
propensity of a firm’s workers to realize their vested options in 
a given year. Let   denote desired realizations and   denote 
actual realizations. We assume that   and   have a 
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1. CPH is the most comprehensive U.S. pay measure. It captures wage 
and salary income, tips and overtime, paid leave and severance pay, 
payments in-kind, benefits, bonus and profit-sharing payments, and 
realizations of stock options.
2. See Farber (1997) and Manski and Straub (2000).
3. See Bell and Neumark (1993), Bell and Kruse (1995), Cohn (1999), 
Duca (1998), Epstein (1999), and Lebow et al. (1999).
4. We stress, however, that although our conclusion represents an 
educated assessment of the impact of stock options on the dynamics 
of CPH, there is a clear need for greater availability of data.
5. See Murphy (1999) for a discussion of the structure of employee 
stock option plans.
6. A common practice is for a cashless transaction to occur using the 
services of a third party. The third party makes a short-term loan to the 
employee to cover the cost of purchasing the exercised options at the 
strike price. The shares are then immediately sold back to the market 
and the loan is paid off, with a fee going to the third party.
7. The restrictions are defined in Internal Revenue Code Section 422.
8. For incentive stock options, there is a minimum holding period for 
the underlying stock that compounds the diversification problem.
No similar restriction applies to nonqualified stock options.
9. A Hewitt Associates study of seventy-four plans in 1998 found that 
35 percent of the plans used cliff vesting (where all shares vest at the 
same specified time), with one and three years being the most frequent 
vesting times; 45 percent used uniform vesting (where shares vest at a 
uniform rate over the vesting period), with three and four years being 
the most frequent vesting times; and the remaining 20 percent used 
either mixed vesting or provided no information (Hewitt Associates 
LLC 1998). The most common expiration date is ten years after the 
grant date.
10. This feature of employee stock options makes them a useful tool for 
reducing employee turnover. Mehran and Yermack (1999) document 
that the probability of a voluntary departure by a CEO is inversely 
related to the length of the stock option vesting schedule. They also 
document that the higher the ratio of deferred compensation to current 
pay, the less likely a CEO is to leave voluntarily. 
11. The median real market value is $8.3 billion for the S&P 500 firms, 
$1.7 billion for the S&P MidCap firms, and $0.4 billion for the S&P 
Small Cap firms.
12. In 1994, ExecuComp began recalculating the grant value of a 
company’s new options using a consistent set of assumptions on the 
interest rate, the implied stock return volatility, and the expected 
duration of the option. Company handbooks on employee stock 
option plans typically do not make any distinction between executive 
and nonexecutive stock option plans. Therefore, we assume that the 
Black-Scholes value of an option granted to an executive and to a 
nonexecutive is the same.
13. There is no general agreement as to what caused the popularity of 
stock options in the 1990s. Murphy (1999) presents a behavioral 
discussion. Hall and Liebman (2000) examine the role of taxes 
whereby under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m), compensation 
above $1 million is not deductible unless it is performance-based. Of 
the 1,672 ExecuComp firms in 1998, 1,566 reported paying less than a 
$1 million salary to their CEOs.
14. This is based on the comparison of COMPUSTAT employ-
ment for ExecuComp firms in 1998 with total employment of 
COMPUSTAT firms in the same year.
15. See U.S. Department of Labor (2000).
16. Our discussion borrows heavily from Yermack (1995).
17. Although volatility always raises the option value of traded stock 
options, Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) and Kulatilaka and 
Marcus (1994) show that increased volatility can lower the value of 
employee stock options, especially for more risk-averse employees.
18. More specifically, the prediction pertains to the relative portion of 
an executive’s compensation that is stock-based. Our dependent 
variable is the total amount of stock options granted, rather than the 
ratio of total stock option grants to total compensation.
19. As a robustness check, we also used the firm’s “before financing” 
marginal tax rate (see Graham [1996, 2001]). We found that both net 
operating loss and marginal tax rates generated the predicted sign and 
were statistically significant. However, because marginal tax rates were 
missing for roughly 15 percent of our COMPUSTAT sample, we 
proceeded using only the net operating loss.32 The Effect of Employee Stock Options 
Endnotes (Continued)
20. The time pattern of exercise for executives may differ from that
of other employees for two reasons. First, executives have private 
information about their firm’s prospects that can alter the timing
of their exercise decision. Second, footnotes in company proxy 
statements typically reveal that top executives may exercise their 
options sooner than the normal vesting schedules permit if certain 
financial conditions are met. Huddart and Lang (1996) find that the 
exercise decisions of top management compared with those of other 
employees are less sensitive to recent stock returns and return 
volatility.
21. Ideally, we would like to use a weighted average of these ratios 
based on the typical vesting pattern for employee stock options. 
However, this is precluded by the short time period covered by the 
ExecuComp sample.
22. For firms with one or two values missing from our control 
variables, we impute these values by regressing the variables in 
question on all other control variables using the estimation sample 
that has no missing values. We then predict their grants and 
realizations using these estimated values for the missing right-hand-
side variables and actual data for the remaining control variables. For 
firms with chronic missing data, we leave their grant and realization 
values missing. We then scale up to a one-digit industry level our 
estimates to cover all public firms by taking our in-sample average 
grants and realizations per employee and multiplying the figure by the 
ratio of total public firm employment in that industry to our in-
sample public firm employment in that industry.
23. We assume that 82 percent of employee stock options represent 
nonqualified stock options, and that this share is constant over our 
sample period (see Hewitt Associates LLC [1998]). When reporting 
the value of new nonqualified stock option grants, we scale down first 
by the 82 percent and then by an additional 50 percent to reflect the 
likely overestimate of the value by the Black-Scholes methodology
(see Huddard and Lang [1996]).
24. Our estimates of the value of stock options per employee are likely 
to be conservative, given our assumption of no stock option use by 
privately held firms.
25. To assess the reliability of our estimates, we also report Monte 
Carlo standard errors. These are computed by simulating draws of 
new coefficient estimates from the stock option grant and realization 
estimations, recalculating all results, and repeating this process 1,000 
times. The reported standard errors are the standard deviations of the 
sample distribution of results for each statistic reported in the table.
26. The adjusted CPH growth rate is sensitive to the assumptions we 
made along the way. For example, if we assume that the cash value of 
new grants is 60 percent (40 percent) of the Black-Scholes value, the 
adjusted CPH growth rate in 1999 is 5.13 percent (4.97 percent).
27. However, firms may reprice their employee stock options and/or 
issue new grants in order to restore incentives. See Carter and Lynch 
(2000) for Financial Accounting Standards Board reporting of 
employee stock option repricings.References
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